

**Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development**

**Nepal Emergency Response of LGCDP-II,**

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**Summary Report [Draft]**



**MoFALD's Emergency Meeting for Earthquake Response on 26th April, 2015**



**LGCDP, Programme Coordination Unit, Kathmandu**

28 June, 2015

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## Acknowledgement

LGCDP, PCU team acknowledge the cooperation of all Ward Citizens Forum (WCF) members; Social Mobilizers; VDC secretaries; Executive Officers; Local Development Officers; LGCDP Staff [DGE, UGE, and Specialists/Experts] mainly those who directly mobilized in emergency response program. It was impossible to serve over 3.5 million affected populations of 14 highly affected districts of Nepal without highly dedicated team of RCU Dhulikhel; DGE and UGEs of Okhaldhunga and Sinduli. Without having expertise in emergency response, the contribution of RCU Dhulikhel team was commendable. We are very grateful with our Development Partners who agreed MoFALD's call to use LGCDP's JFA fund in emergency response. We are indebted with the MoFALD's senior official's leadership which was exceptional in this difficult time that not only approved the "Immediate Relief Support in the Earthquake Affected Areas: Operation Guideline 2015" within few hours but also directly involved in a number of emergency response missions of the affected districts.

Due to the very proactive leadership of LGCDP National Program Manager, Mr. Purusottam Nepal and overall guidance of National Program Director, Mr. Reshmi Raj Pandey the successful utilization of the fund was possible. For this success, support from LGCDP's DP Cell Coordinator Mr. Anil Chandrika for this endeavor was noteworthy. Team work of LGCDP, PCU mainly the active role of Mr. Ek Raj Sigdel, and Mr. Hem Raj Lammichane were very helpful to improve coordination gaps in Rasuwa and Nuwakot. Similarly, support from RCU Hetauda experts Shree Bhagawan Thakur, Gopal Biraji was helpful in this critical time. Joint Monitoring team from DPs representative was useful which found some of the important issues to utilize the fund. Their advice and suggestions from the allocation of funding, preparing guideline, and timely monitoring is very much appreciated. Lastly, active role of Nagesh Badu and Reshu Karki played excellent role while preparing regular updates and communicating to DPs and other stakeholders.

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## Summary

A 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal on 25 April at 11:56 local time creating large scale damage and many casualties followed by strong aftershocks, including a 6.7 magnitude quake on 26 April, continue to threaten the lives of thousands of people and to further damage buildings and infrastructure (OCHA, 2015). It is estimated that the lives of eight million people, almost one-third of the population of Nepal, have been impacted by these earthquakes. Thirty-one of the country's 75 districts have been affected, out of which 14 were declared 'crisis-hit' (see Figure 1) for the purpose of prioritizing rescue and relief operations; another 17 neighbouring districts are partially affected (PDNA, 2015).

### Effect on local bodies:

As the result of this devastating earthquake total 429 buildings of local bodies totally and 384 buildings partially damaged (see detailed in table-1). As the result the local bodies had a big challenge to provide necessary emergency relief support to the affected population.

**Table-1: Damage local bodies' infrastructure/office buildings**

VDC Offices	Municipality Office	DDC Offices
267 totally damaged	135 totally damaged	27 totally damaged
216 partially damaged	137 partially damaged	31 partially damaged

In response to this earthquake, on the second day (26 April), MoFALD organized an emergency meeting, and decided to mobilize all staff in relief and response activities and on 29th it has made a decision to provide 50.48 million. For this, JFA Development Partners provided their full cooperation as they participated from the formulation of guideline for using fund; consent to utilize the Local Governance and Capacity Development Programme –II Fund on Emergency Response. On the same day, the team formed a coordination team under the leadership of National Program Manager to monitor and provide daily update that prepared daily updates, monitored progress through Regional Coordination Unit and Districts; provided guidance and back up support by mobilizing additional human resource from other districts and the PCU; made field visit; and updated this in MoFALD, DPs and other stakeholders. In addition to this,

MoFALD mobilized its Disaster Management Section for providing overall coordination and support to the local bodies and assigned two districts to under secretaries; mobilized three Joint Secretaries in the most affected districts; immediately send back more than 45 VDC Secretaries staying in other offices for temporary assignment. In the very critical time MoFALD decided to mobilize LGCDP resources as part of "Immediate Relief Support Fund (IRSF)".

### **Empowering ISRF utilization process**

One of the major challenges was to reach out to the affected people immediately through local bodies so that the affected population gets immediate relief support from their nearest government. Following the regular system was not developed for responding emergency context. Considering this context, MoFALD decided to develop a brief guideline that provides full authority for using the fund to respective VDC and Municipality Ward level committee that comprised: VDC Secretary/ Municipality Ward Secretary as Coordinator; Coordinators of Ward Citizen's Forum (WCF) as member; Women Community Awareness Center (CAC) as member and Social Mobilizer of LGCDP as member secretary. In the case of vacant social mobilizers the guideline authorized the concerned committee to nominate member secretary.

As the result of this guideline, social mobilizers became the primary agent of mobilizing significant amount of money for the humanitarian causes thereby they are empowered as they felt they are highly recognized by the government. Though many social mobilizers overloaded with this very critical responsibility in the time of crisis and mostly this was more challenging who were more affected from earthquake. The lowest governance institution like WCF, CAC and VDC Secretaries taken this decision as their recognition from Government in the time of crisis. This was very promising decision mainly because the decision was made in the time when people were coming out from rescue phase and started seeking help from local government. As the fund disbursement was made based on the decisions of lowest body of government and local institutions the affected population highly appreciated this approach. Similarly, use of this fund was made public using mass media like local and national newspapers, radio and television channels frequently. On top of this, as per the guideline each local body carried out public audit about the fund utilization which provided guidance to all other humanitarian agencies to make their humanitarian expenditure transparent.

### Utilization of the allocated fund

LGCDP provided support to the earthquake affected population with shelter, food, health, drinking water and sanitation. This support was 900,000 per VDCs in highly affected five districts and Rs. 450,000 for per VDCs of affected nine districts; and Rs. 200,000 per ward of municipalities of those districts.

Table-2: Total fund utilization

Total Fund Released	Total Fund Utilized	Balance
504,850,000.00	483,113,061 [95.7%]	21,736,939.39 (4.3%)

Out of allocated and provided Rs. 504,850,000 [Five Hundred Four Million, Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand] for the response, total 483,113,061 is utilized which is 95.7% of the total allocation. Rs. 21,736,939 is unspent of which the largest saving was made by Kathmandu Metropolitan [3.9 million] as they mobilized their internal resources; Dudhauri Municipality of Sinduli as they responded the minor damage by using sources other than LGCDP Immediate Relief Support Fund (IRSF). The line item wise spending is presented in figure-1. Total 377.05 million was allocated for 580 VDCs of 12 earthquake affected districts [see annex-1 for detail]. These VDCs spent 96.84 per cent of total allocated amount which is 5 percent higher than spending ratio of 41 Municipalities [see annex-2 for detailed information].




Figure 1: Line Item Wise Spending of LGCDP Emergency Fund

Immediate Relief Support The largest amount 32 percent was utilized for temporary shelter followed by food (30%), transportation and others 17%, sanitation and health 13% and the lowest percent (8%) for drinking water. Fund (IRSF) was very helpful for providing support over 4 million affected populations of the highly affected districts.





Figure 2 shows that out of total 14 districts Sindupalckok , Nuwakot, Bhaktapur, Ramechhap and Gorkha spent 100 percent fund whereas Kathmandu, Sinduli, Rasuwa and Dolakha utilized below 90 percent of the total allocated fund. Total 74.68% was allocated for VDCs whereas 25.32% was for 41 municipalities.



Of the total fund, 127.8 million [25.31%] was allocated for 41 Earthquake Municipalities of 13 districts [there is no Municipality in earthquake affected Rasuwa District]. Of 127.8 million a

total 92.29% of the total allocated fund for those 41 municipalities (117,948,753) has been spent. Municipalities located in Kathmandu not used NRs 5.8 million whereas Dhudauli Municipality of Sinduli not utilized the allocated entire 2.2 million.

## Challenges

1. MoFALD is experienced body for leading local development, governance related activities at the local as well as national levels. Mobilizing large number of local bodies [580 VDCs and 41 Municipalities] and their untrained staff for emergency response was challenging. Providing service in the aftermath of large earthquake was moral as well as professional role for all local bodies, and lack of experience and training was one of the major challenges for timely and coordinated response at local level.
2. The Empowering ISRF utilization Guideline prepared by MoFALD deliberately provided authority to local bodies where there was no direct stake of political party representatives [traditionally known as all party mechanism - the political elites]. As the result in number of local bodies political party representatives challenged the guideline and therefore LBs have to face many difficulties while utilizing the fund.
3. In some cases the role of WCF could not become very objective as they were reported to be biased with certain groups rather than being very fair while distributing relief fund.
4. Distributing equal amount of fund to all VDCs was not realistic as the number of affected population and households were vast different in VDCs near to the urban center to the very remote areas. As the result there was a high disparity of per capita fund allocation for the affected population in affected districts.
5. There was high security challenge for social mobilizers (SM) and VDC secretaries while selecting beneficiaries, type of service and materials. As the result many VDC Secretaries were assaulted, beaten, threatened. As the fund mobilization committee was established just for emergency response, they were not organized, experienced for managing large fund and therefore they were very confused about their roles, authorities and responsibilities. Many of them merely taken action based on what they heard from their colleagues, DGEs or RCU staff.
6. Managing large amount of emergency supplies was another challenge as the markets in the affected districts are not big enough to get large amount of immediately required



items like tarpaulins, CGI sheets, and food items among others. Similarly, transportation of these items in remote area was challenging as roads were blocked by landslides.

7. High expectations of affected people; demand for cash, and identifying and prioritizing their needs were other important challenges.
8. Coordination among different actors at the district as well as local level was a major challenge at the initial stage. Due to this issue, some affected people got more relief materials than others as the result local level disputes were also observed.
9. Lack of proper and coordinated rapid assessment, the relief distribution work was largely based on general information provided by the locals. In some cases the locals were found to be more concerned about getting relief materials rather than being responsible to build their community better. For proper coordination the VDC level Disaster Management Committee was overlooked by the ISRF utilization Guideline.
10. There was no adequate monitoring and supervision of the mobilized fund from MoFALD and inadequate motivational package for the staff working in emergency response.
11. At the MoFALD the Disaster Management Section was not directly involved in this process as the result two separate formats were sent to the field from DMS section and PCU. Similarly, there was no day-to-day interaction between the DMS section and PCU for harmonized response activities.

## **Lessons Learned**

- Good trust between DPs and MoFALD can lead quick decision for transferring large amount of fund for emergency reponse.
- There was no contingency plan that can be activated in emergency or any other circumstances. Contingency plan with risk matrix needs to be prepared for large projects like LGCDP II.
- Providing basic orientation to the Emergency Fund Management Committee was very useful for using fund as per the guideline.
- That staffs, LBs, families who had better social network, social or economic capital and multiple options are found more resilient in emergency situation than others.
- A flexible fund from LGCDP is very supportive to cater the needs of community.
- Committed staff can make a lot difference even if they are not trained to work in emergencies.

- It is very difficult to provide emergency service to their citizens in those VDCs where VDC secretaries were vacant and also in those VDCs where there was no full time secretary available.

## **Recommendations**

1. It is highly appreciated that MoFALD provided timely relief fund that can be used for emergency response at the local level. The fund allocation needs to be different in different LBs as they have vast difference in population density, affect of earthquake. So the formula based fund allocation can be practiced in future.
2. Emergency focal person should be nominated at LGCDP who should be made responsible for providing training on Emergency Preparedness and Responses as part of regular capacity development process.
3. Local level Disaster Management Committee formed at the VDC and Municipality should be strengthened.
4. Local bodies must adopt and implement National Building Code to minimize casualties for which MoFALD has to provide support to local bodies.
5. Fulfill VDC secretaries in all VDCs. For this additional number of VDC secretaries and Ward Secretaries in Municipality should be managed by MoFALD for providing effective services in general and specially in the time of emergency.
6. Timing of public audit should be extended as the SM, ward staff and affected people all are involved in relief distribution tasks in their VDC/wards

## ANNEXEX

### Annex -1: Total Fund Utilization by Districts

Status of Funds (Budget) provided by LGCDP for Earthquake Relief Program										
S.No	District	Amount on NRs.								
		Drinking Water, Medicinal & First AID	Materials for temporary camps & Shelter	Food Management	Toilets/sanitary and cleaning	Others (Transportation cost)	Total Fund Amount Provided	Total Fund Amount Utilized	Total Fund Amount - Unspent	% of Spending
1	Lalitpur	1025837	2239480	3347554	2071905	1601020 0	26150000	24694976	1455024	94
2	Kavre	1418958	24542782	15518572	238599	3898089	47200000	45617000	1583000	97
3	Ramechhap	1006000	16083844	6057840	143000	1959316	25250000	25250000	0	100
4	Makwanpur	3709000	16759552	1447816	868312	135690	24550000	22920370	1629630	93
5	Dolakha	6420469	3380000	8629931	4770000	300000	26400000	23500400	2899600	89
6	Sindupalchok	1550000	14600000	42600000	2700000	4550000	66000000	66000000	0	100
7	Nuwakot	31726079	4881222	4867000	9261698	6364001	57100000	57100000	0	100
8	Dhading	7117776	14468556	12340404	1334700	8145091	44000000	43406527	593473	99
9	Rasuwa	870000	4700000	7700000	304000	826000	16200000	14400000	1800000	89
10	Kathmandu	370275	8030550	4091555	584500	2170000 0	40600000	34776880	5,823,120.00	86
11	Bhaktapur	345000	17325000	130000	600000	0	18400000	18400000	0	100
12	Sinduli	887248	15941732	7015006	21137	1081786	28300000	24946908	3353092	88
13	Okhaldhunga	4781000	2544000	2660000	9140900	3374100	25100000	22500000	2600000	90
14	Gorkha	2350000	11651000	28960000	4377000	1226200 0	59600000	59600000	0	100
<b>Total</b>		<b>63577642</b>	<b>157147718</b>	<b>145365678</b>	<b>36415751</b>	<b>80606273</b>	<b>504850000</b>	<b>483113061</b>	<b>21,736,939.39</b>	<b>95.7</b>

## Annex -2: Total Fund Utilization by Municipalities

S.No	Name of Metro/SMC/MUN	District	Amount on NRs.					Total Fund Amount Provided	Total Fund Amount Utilized
			on Drinking Water, Medicinal & First AID	on materials for temporary camps & Shelter	on Food Management	on toilets/sanitary and cleaning	Others (Transportation cost)		
1	Changunaraya	Bhaktapur	0	3100000	0	100000	0	3200000	3200000
2	Anantalingeshow		160000	2770000	30000	40000	0	3000000	3000000
3	Suryabinayak		170000	2230000	0	400000	0	2800000	2800000
4	Mahamanjushree Nagarkot		0	2600000	0	0	0	2600000	2600000
5	Madhyapur Thimi		15000	3225000	100000	60000	0	3400000	3400000
6	Bhaktapur		0	3400000	0	0	0	3400000	3400000
7	Nilkhantha	Dhading	1010441.58	818885	0	13200	164000	2600000	2006526.58
8	Bhimeshwor	Dolakha	300000	0	800000	1300000	0	2600000	2400000
9	Jiri		0	2200000	0	0	0	2200000	2200000
10	Kathmandu Metro	Kathmandu	148825	572,000	1,941,555	414500	0	7000000	3,076,880
11	Kirtipur		221450	3158550	250000	170000	0	3800000	3800000
12	Tokha		0	0	0	0	3000000	3000000	3000000
13	Nagarjun		0	0	0	0	2800000	2800000	2800000
14	Dakshinkali		0	1100000	1900000	0	0	3000000	3000000
15	Chandragiri		0	0	0	0	4300000	4600000	4300000
16	Tarkeshwor		0	0	0	0	4200000	4200000	4200000
17	Kageshwori Manahara		0	0	0	0	1000000	2,600,000	1,000,000
18	Bhudanilkhantha		0	0	0	0	3400000	3400000	3400000
19	Gokarneshwor		0	3200000	0	0	0	3200000	3200000
20	Shankarapur	0	0	0	0	3000000	3000000	3000000	
21	Dhulikhel	Kavre	57958	1592714	137589	0	11739	1800000	1800000
22	Panauti		0	2600000	0	0	0	2600000	2600000
23	Banepa		0	1736068.47	186582.86	126598.67	750	2200000	2050000

24	Kashikhanda		0.0	2600000.0	400000.0	0.0	0.0	3000000.0	3000000.0
25	Paanchkhaal		0	1700000	1700000	0	0	3400000	3400000
26	Lalitpur SMC	Lalitpur	562037	1592480	2127554	258705	4200	6000000	4544976
27	Godawari		60000	0	540000	0	1800000	2400000	2400000
28	Karyabinayak		403800	647000	680000	1813200	56000	3600000	3600000
29	Mahalaxmi		0	0	0	0	3800000	3800000	3800000
29	Hetauda	Makwanpur	34000	2767052	1257816	48312	63190	5800000	4170370
30	Taha		0.0	3000000	0.0	0.0	0	3000000	3000000.0
31	Bidur	Nuwakot	1,755,000	100000	0	345,000	0	2200000	2,200,000
32	Ramechhap	Ramechhap	0	0	1800000	0	0	1800000	1800000
33	Manthali		0	2580000	600000	0	20000	3200000	3200000
34	Chautara	Sindhupalchok	0	500000	1200000	0	100000	1800000	1800000
35	Melamchi		500000	0	2000000	500000	0	3000000	3000000
36	Kamalamai Municipality	Sinduli		3,600,000					3,600,000
38	Dhudauli		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
39	Siddicharan Municipality	Okhaldhunga	73100	2386900	90000	50000			2,600,000
40	palungtaar Municipality	Gorkha	510000	1530000	170000		390000	510000	2,600,000
41	Gorkha			3000,000					3,000,000
	<b>Total Expenditure</b>		<b>5,981,612</b>	<b>60,306,649</b>	<b>17,911,097</b>	<b>5,639,516</b>	<b>28,109,879</b>	<b>127,800,000</b>	<b>117,948,753</b>

### Annex III: Damaged DDC, Municipality and VDC Buildings



Damage details of  
Building\_Final 10 June